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Abstract: Development strategies based on neoliberal theories and good gover-
nance have failed to achieved clear outcomes. This paper examines the Saemaul
Undong movement in Korea with the contention that it can provide a missing
link between market- and state-oriented development policy. Saemaul Undong
contributed to social and economic development in Korea not only as a self-help
community movement but also as a mechanism of social inclusion. Its success
was based on a social structure that was made more open to upward mobility by
the land reform of the 1950s. A negative aspect of Saemaul Undong is that it
was promoted by the government to mobilize political support for authoritarian
President Park Chung Hee. In order to draw policy implications from Saemaul
Undong for international development, it is necessary to consider the social and
political context of the developing countries under consideration.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the quality of life we enjoy is higher than ever before, a billion people
still live in absolute poverty. In order to fight poverty, it is necessary for the develop-
ing countries, where the majority of poor people live, to achieve both economic and
social development. Nevertheless, it is clear that the developing countries cannot tackle
poverty by themselves. The governments, civil society organizations, and citizens of
the developed countries should participate in the fight against poverty. Multilateral
agencies such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have also worked hard to
reduce poverty and promote development.
One way to help developing countries is to provide financial assistance. Another is
to share the development experience of countries that have made a successful transi-
tion from poverty to an industrialized economy in order to suggest development policy
options. In the latter context, this paper will examine the Saemaul Undong movement
in Korea from a structural perspective—what socioeconomic conditions made the
movement successful, and what role it played in the transition from a predominantly
rural economy to a modern, industrialized one—and seek policy implications for the
international development debate.
Saemaul Undong was initiated by the government in 1971 as a rural community
movement. Through it, the government provided small startup subventions for projects
to develop local communities economically. For example, the government allocated
material for constructing village roads, bridges, electrification infrastructure, and storage
sheds crucial for these communities’ economic development. Villagers provided free
labor for these projects. Government subventions accounted for 20 to 30 percent of
expenditures, local residents’ labor and other contributions constituted another 30 to
60 percent, and private donations and bank loans provided the rest (Kim 1991).
The government spent on average 2.5 percent of GNP per year on the Saemaul
Undong projects—an immense amount of social spending, given that there was a
strict, means-tested public assistance program in place. These policies were combined
with a nationwide campaign to mobilize human resources and change attitudes. Sae-
maul Undong was a social endeavor that combined aspects of a social fund program
and a community movement. This paper will explore the lessons it offers for the cur-
rent policy debate.
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APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT POLICY
During the early 2000s, international development policy emphasized good gover-
nance as a development strategy, arguing that poor performance in economic develop-
ment and poverty reduction in many developing countries stemmed from inadequate
governance (Grindle 2004). The good governance approach was a response to failures
in past state- and market-centered development policy paradigms. Gough and Wood
pointed out that the lack of effective and efficient state and market institutions in many
developing countries is the main obstacle to development (Gough and Wood 2004,
15). In many developing countries, market institutions are not working well in produc-
ing goods, and the state is captured by special interests instead of functioning as a neu-
tral actor to manage different social interests. They maintained that good governance
of those institutions is a necessary condition for overcoming such difficulties and
achieving development.
Good governance requires, among other things, trust between people. The simple
fact that there are institutions in place does not necessarily mean that they are working
effectively. It is necessary for public and private actors to work together. This involves
rational discussions, persuasion, and coordination. Development strategy based on
governance theory is an effort to synthesize state- and market-centered paradigms of
development, which are often seen as competing.
The Millennium Development Declaration, in which 189 heads of state and leaders
of government pledged in September 2000 to do their best for the people suffering
from poverty, hunger, and disease, aimed to reduce poverty in the world by half, based
on a strategy of good governance. The World Bank and the UN Millennium Project,
head by Jeffrey Sachs, emphasized the importance of good governance as a way to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in general and poverty reduction
in particular (UNDP 2005). This led to an emerging consensus among global institu-
tions and policy commentators that good governance would bring about poverty
reduction.
After some years of implementation, however, the MDGs show a mixed outcome.
The goal of reducing the number of people living in poverty by half by 2015 is expect-
ed to be met on a global basis (World Bank 2005b). This is good news for the MDGs.
The somber truth is, however, that progress is unequal among the regions of the world
and within nation states. China’s economic growth accounts for a great deal of poverty
reduction in the world, while regions like sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and
parts of Southeast Asia have not made significant progress (UN Millennium Project
2005). Therefore, it is hard to say that we are on track to success in achieving MDG 1.
Some commentators maintain that good governance does not necessarily lead to
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poverty reduction and economic development (Coelho and Favareto 2008; Kwon and
Kwak 2008).
From this empirical observation emerges a doubt about the effectiveness of current
anti-poverty strategies in developing countries. If market solutions are not enough, and
good governance does not produce the intended outcome of poverty reduction, what is
the missing link? This paper argues that a program like Saemaul Undong could link
state, market, and civil society efforts for poverty reduction.
Among the many successful community movements, Saemaul Undong in Korea
deserves a close examination because it shows that a community movement and the
state can work together for poverty reduction. Saemaul Undong was able to bring
about people’s active participation in the development project, which is often missing.
This paper will first examine the historical conditions for the success of Saemaul
Undong and its role in linking state, civil society, and grass-roots participation in
development. It will examine the land reform that took place in Korea in the late
1940s and 1950s and the conditions that were instrumental in Saemaul Undong’s suc-
cess. Finally, it will show that Saemaul Undong was not only a community movement
but also multifunctional links for development policy that the state could implement
for economic development and poverty reduction. The paper will explain how Sae-
maul Undong contributed to the Korea’s social and economic development through
multiple functions such as social inclusion and income generation mechanism.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LAND REFORM IN KOREA
Land reform has been a controversial issue in the development debate.1 Some
argue that it is a prerequisite to successful economic development, while others argue
that it inevitably brings about political turmoil, which disrupts economic development.
A body of literature has pointed out that successful land reform in the late 1940s and
50s in Japan, Korea and Taiwan was strongly related to economic development and
poverty reduction (e.g., World Bank 2006). Access to even a small amount of land can
provide a source of self-employment and an important safety net for the economic
contingencies that occur over a lifetime (Dasgupta and Ray 1987; Deininger and Bin-
swanger 1999). Land ownership also affects economic growth through investment in
soil improvement and farming tools—an effort that owners are much more likely to
make than tenants, because it improves their assets.
Despite this positive relationship between equitable landownership and agricultural
90 Implications of Korea’s Saemaul Undong for International Development Policy
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
1. This section draws extensively on the author’s previous work in Kwon and Yi 2009.
productivity, it is not necessarily true that there has been a direct positive relationship
between land reform and economic development in Korea. Economic development in
Korea was not mainly based on the growth of the agricultural sector (Adelman 1997),
and some scholars see the land reform as a failure since it did not create an agricultural
sector that was dominated by middle-class farmers (Hwang 1985). The mechanism by
which land reform contributed to economic development has been discussed in depth
elsewhere. This paper will focus on the link between the land reform and Saemaul
Undong.
The land reform, which took place in three waves from 1946 to 1955, gave people
who had been tenants of Korean and Japanese landlords under the Japanese rule
(1910-1945) the opportunity to become independent farmers. After World War II, the
American military government (1945-1948) took the first step of the land reform in
1946. It limited peasants’ rental payments for land to one-third of the value of the
land’s annual harvest, which was a drastic reduction. In 1948, the American military
government sold land that used to belong to the Japanese Oriental Development Com-
pany (later the New Korea Public Company) to tenants for prices equivalent to three
years of harvests.
Affected by the socialist land reform in North Korea, the sovereign Korean govern-
ment, established in 1948, promulgated a series of land reform laws in 1949 and imple-
mented them from 1949 to 1955. These included three basic principles with more
emphasis on equality than growth: (1) only those who are actually farming can own farm
land; (2) land can be owned up to a maximum of three chungbos (hectares); and (3)
farmers cannot contract out their land to others for farming (Sin 1988). Based on these
principles, the government bought land from those who owned more than the maximum
or did not farm it themselves, and sold it to those who had farmed it as tenants.2
Although some landowners sold their land before the implementation of the land
reform, more than 60 percent of the land was bought by government. Landowners were
paid with government bonds, while tenant farmers were able to buy the land from the
government for a price equivalent to one and a half times the annual harvest, which
they could pay over a three-year period (Kim 1997, 307). In 1945, 65 percent of farmers
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2. There are three main explanations of the political rationale for the land reform. The first
stresses that peasants suffered the most from Japanese rule while many landlords were seen
as collaborators with the Japanese. The second explains that President Syngman Rhee want-
ed to undermine the economic basis of the conservative political elite, many of whom were
landlords. The third argues that land reform was a US counter-revolution against the com-
munist threat. The United States recommended land reform not only to the Korean but also
the Taiwanese governments (Kim 1976).
were tenant farmers; by 1951, after the land reform, the figure was 8.1 percent.
It would be fair to say that the land reform in Korea was successful in that it helped
farmers to own their own land. The inequality of land ownership was reduced sharply.
For example, in Yongmun village in Chungnam Province, the Gini index of land own-
ership came down from more than 0.63 to less than 0.50 (Cho 2003, 297), while the
productivity of farming increased.
The land reform provided two vital conditions for success of the Saemaul Undong.
It created farmers who owned their own land and whose economic interest was in line
with community development in rural areas. The core program of Saemaul Undong
was the construction and renovation of community infrastructure. For independent
farmers, modernization of the infrastructure of their community would directly lead to
increased productivity of their own agricultural land. Tenant farmers would not neces-
sarily see the direct benefits of such efforts.
Saemaul Undong was launched in April 1970 when President Park addressed rural
residents and local officials during a visit to the southeast region. He said:
We need to support ourselves to develop our villages. With aspirations of self-
help, self-reliance and cooperation, we can make our village rich and turn it into
a good place to live. (quoted in Oh 2002)
At first glance, these remarks seemed to emphasize that people in rural communi-
ties should not expect the state to help them but should help themselves. Therefore, the
key idea of Saemaul Undong is self-help, which is then extended to self-reliance and
cooperation. Citizens who participated in the Saemaul Undong movement needed to
contribute their labor and other resources to community projects. Government support,
mostly in the form of raw materials and occasionally financial subsidies, accounted for
only a small part of what was necessary.
There was significant support for Saemul Undong in rural villages, according to
newspaper reports in the early 1970s (Kim 2004). Such energetic voluntary participa-
tion at the grassroots level was made possible not only by government mobilization
but also by the genuine prospect for a better quality of life. Support for Saemul
Undong is shown in table 1.
Secondly, land reform boosted the expansion of education which would then
became a catalyst of Saemaul Undong. Families in rural areas who now owned their
own land and experienced higher productivity were able to send their children to
school instead of to the paddy fields (Cho 2003). The community leaders of Saemaul
Undong who were equipped with necessary education were able to organize the move-
ment effectively.
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Education was the biggest item in the government budget after defense in the late
1950s and 60s; this resulted in the astonishing record of educational expansion com-
pared to other developing countries that reinforced the effect of the land reform on
education. The number of students from both rural and urban backgrounds increased
370 percent for liberal arts secondary schools, 299 percent for vocational high schools,
and 1,292 percent for higher education from 1945 to 1959; and the literacy rate
reached almost 90 percent in the late 1950s (USAID 1959; Cho and Oh 2003, 283). In
short, the land reform not only sharply reduced the inequality of landownership, it also
played a powerful role in reducing poverty and increasing the level of education in the
rural population.
SAEMAUL UNDONG AS A MECHANISM FOR SOCIAL INCLUSION
Another important aspect of Saemul Undong is its role in promoting social integra-
tion during Korea’s rapid industrialization. A large body of literature on Saemaul
Undong has agreed that it contributed to economic development in Korea during the
1970s. While this is certainly true, it is also necessary to take a balanced point of view.
Economic development in Korea in the 1970s and 1980s was mainly driven by indus-
trialization, with a smaller contribution by the agricultural sector (Adelman 1997). The
number of employees in the agricultural sector decreased steadily, as shown in table 2.
This suggests that the success of Saemaul Undong, which took place mainly in rural
agricultural communities, had only limited impact on overall economic development
in Korea.
In this vein, some critics have argued that Saemaul Undong was not in fact a suc-
cess, in that more people left rural communities for cities in the 1970s (3.7 percent)
than in the 1960s (1.3 percent) (Oh 2002). Such criticism certainly makes a point, but
it is also necessary to look at Saemaul Undong from the perspective of the changing
structure of Korean society.
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Table 1. Growth of Saemaul Undong
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Supporters in rural areasa 72 320 675 373 489 351 451 1,336
Total supportersa 72 320 693 1,069 1,169 1,175 1,372 2,709
Projects in rural areasb 385 320 1,093 415 696 630 2,200
Total projectsb 385 320 1,093 1,099 1,598 887 2,463 2,667
a millions; b thousands
Source: Oh 2002.
Korea’s economic development has been primarily industrial: first in the form of
import substitution, second through exports, and third through heavy and chemical
industry. After the 1990s, the economic strategy shifted to advanced technology-based
industries such as information technology, electronics, and automobiles. Given that
development was not based primarily on agricultural or raw materials, the assessment
of Saemaul Undong needs to take the path of industrialization into consideration. In
this context, we can approach Saemaul Undong from a structural point of view and
ask how it contributed to the structural transition of Korean society from predominant-
ly rural to modern and industrialized.
Many developing countries that had initial success in industrialization could not
sustain it. Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines are examples. One of the main rea-
sons for their failure to achieve sustainable growth was their extreme social inequality
and inability to tap the huge reservoir of human resources in the rural areas (Kohli
2004; Kwon and Yi 2009).
In contrast, underlying Korea’s successful and sustained industrialization was the
fact that rural areas were not left behind in the social transformation. On the contrary,
people in rural areas supported a vital core of industrialization, that is young and edu-
cated workers from rural arears. Rural families provided a skilled and educated work-
force for industrializing urban areas. This was possible because of mass education and
the land reform that took place from 1946 to 1955. The land reform also seriously
weakened the landowning class, who might have hindered the structural changes of
industrialization, and provided a vital source of income to families in the agricultural
sector.
In 1961, the Korean government adopted poverty-reduction policies such as elimi-
nation of usurious loans in rural areas. Usury had been widespread, embedded in an
economy based on subsistence agriculture. Shortly after taking power in 1961, the mil-
itary government enacted measures to ensure that loans were registered. Farmers with
high-interest debts could transfer them to agricultural cooperatives—nationwide farm-
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Table 2. Employees by Industry (percentage)
Agriculture and forestry Manufacturing and mining Service
1966 57.89 10.48 31.27
1971 48.44 14.19 37.37
1978 38.41 23.15 38.44
1985 24.94 24.44 50.62
1990 18.25 27.32 54.42
Source: National Statistical Office 1966, 1986, 1990.
ers’ organizations—that offered a longer grace period and lower interest, while lenders
received a bond from the cooperatives. Further usurious practices were made illegal
afterwards. Agricultural cooperatives began to play the role of formal rural credit insti-
tutions where loans were traded competitively and effectively. They could respond to
credit needs among specific crop growers, or in specific regions, with their diversified
loan portfolios.
Saemaul Undong appeared in the 1970s, after these earlier efforts had already
brought major social changes to the agricultural sector. Through this movement, farm-
ers renovated their houses, repaired village roads, built community halls, and estab-
lished cooperatives. Through these projects the living standard of people in rural com-
munities was improved and poverty was reduced drastically among rural as well as
urban households (see Table 3). More importantly, the rural communities kept pace
with the changes brought about by economic development.
Saemaul Undong did not come out of the blue; if it had, it would not have received
such an enthusiastic reception. It was a historical effort that made Korea’s economic
development broad-based with effective poverty reduction and relatively equal distrib-
ution of income. Despite his criticism of Saemaul Undong, Koh (2006) recognized
that it brought small farmers and their families into the fold of modern citizenry. In
this sense, it was an important factor in Korea’s economic success, although it did not
reverse the decline of the rural sector.
SAEMAUL UNDONG AS A FORM OF AUTHORITARIAN 
MOBILIZATION
One of the key ideas of Saemaul Undong is self-help, which is extended to self-
reliance and cooperation. As mentioned earlier, citizens who participated in the move-
ment contributed their labor and other resources to community projects. The govern-
ment’s contribution of raw materials and (occasionally) finances accounted for only a
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Table 3. Incidence of Absolute Poverty (percentage)
1965 1970 1976 1980 1991
Urban households 54.9 16.2 18.1 10.4 8.7
Rural households 35.8 27.9 11.7 9.0 2.8
All households 40.9 23.4 14.8 9.8 7.6
Note: The absolute poverty line was 121,000 won per month (at 1981 prices) for a five-person household.
Source: Kwon 1998, 34.
small part of the movement’s support. Furthermore, people came together and dis-
cussed what projects their communities needed. In a nutshell, this was a quintessential
community movement. There was great enthusiasm at the grassroots level for Saemaul
Undong (Kim 2004). This energetic voluntary participation was the linchpin that
linked economic development to poverty reduction. This could be a vital lesson for
many other developing countries.
Nevertheless, critics have pointed out, and it would be difficult to deny, that Sae-
maul Undong was also a political mobilization tool for the authoritarian government
(Lim 2004). While people voluntarily participated in the movement, they were also
led to support the Park Chung-Hee regime. To understand this, it is necessary to
understand the political context of the early 1970s in Korea.
Park Chung-Hee led the 1961 military coup that crushed a democratic political sys-
tem. After the coup he first served as vice-chairman (later chairman) of the temporary
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction until he had himself elected president in
1963. The new regime had an urgent need to give itself legitimacy. In its first year it
published a five-year economic plan (building on planning that had been started under
the Second Republic), in which it presented the coup as a revolution. The Park govern-
ment shifted economic policy from import substitution industrialization to export-led
development in the mid 1960s, during which the economy recorded impressive
growth, simultaneously with a reduction in poverty.
During this period, GNP increased rapidly and unemployment fell sharply, as table
4 shows. Import substitution industrialization absorbed labor effectively: employment
increased by 10 percent despite the increase of the economically active population by
12 percent (Adelman 1997, 514). From 1967 to 1971, labor-intensive industries con-
tinued to absorb labor, together with the growing service sector, which raised the
income of the working population. In particular, poverty in urban areas was reduced.
However, there was a clear increase in the income gap between urban and rural house-
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Table 4. Major Economic Indicators in Korea
1961 1966 1972 1981 1987 1993
GNP per capita ($) 90 125 306 1,741 3,218 7,513
Growth rate (%) 1.6 6.8 16.1 21.3 10.7 15.2
Unemployment rate (%)1
172 15 10 10 5 4
(7) (6) (4) (4) (3) (3)
Source: recited from Adelman 1997, 535.
1 This includes both the unemployed and those working fewer than 18 hours a week. Figures in parentheses represent the
completely unemployed.
2 This figure is for 1963.
holds. The average income of rural households was only 62.6 percent of that of urban
households (Oh 2002, 163). There was a clear policy demand to correct this gap, and
Saemaul Undong was one of the responses.
Nevertheless, politics underlay the voluntary community movement. Park Chung-
Hee, serving his second term as president, was supposed to retire from politics in
1971. But he stood for a third term in 1971 after the constitution was changed. In
1972, President Park changed the constitution once again so that he could remain in
office as long as he wanted. In this context, considering that the Saemaul Undong was
started in 1970 by President Park, it is difficult to tell the difference between voluntary
participation in the movement and political mobilization by the authoritarian govern-
ment (Koh 2006).
Scholars and commentators have long debated the political nature of Saemaul
Undong. It is clear that the movement has both strengths and weaknesses in its politi-
cal nature. While people participated voluntarily with great enthusiasm, it is also
important to recognize that this movement can be taken advantage of politically. What
we can learn from the Korean experience is that one should be alert to such weaknesses
when starting a community movement such as Saemaul Undong.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Much attention is paid to the policy implications of Saemul Undong’s micro-level
characteristics. Such an approach is useful for community activists who can learn
directly from the experiences of Saemaul Undong. But it is also necessary to view
Saemaul Undong from a structural perspective, and investigate what socioeconomic
conditions allowed it to be so successful and what role it played in facilitating Korea’s
transition from a rural economy to a modern, industrialized one. With answers to such
questions, we will be able to draw policy implications at the theoretical level.
Given that the core features of Saemul Undong are self-help and self-reliance for
community development, this paper has argued that the land reform that created inde-
pendent farmers in Korea in the 1950s was critical for the success of Saemaul
Undong. Since the improvement of community infrastructure would improve the pro-
ductivity of land-owning farmers, the movement was able to attract their active partic-
ipation. Further, despite political mobilization efforts by the government, it is fair to
say that Saemaul Undong was organized by local community leaders who knew best
what their communities needed. From this observation, we can suggest that a commu-
nity movement for economic development should have a social structure that would
allow local people to participate voluntarily not only for community development but
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also for the improvement of their own well-being.
In terms of the structural role of Saemaul Undong, this paper has showed that it
contributed to the social inclusion of rural community members in the process of
industrialization. Not only did it improve the quality of life in rural areas, but it also
brought the rural community into the mainstream of social change. This is a key rea-
son that Korea’s experience of development has been strong and sustainable.
The most critical weakness of Saemaul Undong today is that it seems to remain in
its old form. Its present image and understanding are still set in the context of Korean
society 30 years ago. Its antiquated form of understanding is becoming irrelevant to
Korean society and other societies in the developing world. The challenge facing us is
to transform Saemaul Undong so that it can continue to provide useful guidelines for
community movements.
It is also important for Korean scholars and community movement activists to
understand developing societies and their social challenges. Attempting to transfer the
Korean experience to other societies without understanding those societies is often
futile. International collaboration is essential, for example in the form of academic
workshops and common community projects. The role of the Korean government will
be critical to ensuring that those collaborations take place.
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